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1 Most observers view the expansion of high-risk 
mortgage loans between 2004 and 2006 as a 
particularly dramatic example of a widespread 
decline in lending standards. While the 
research on this episode is expanding rapidly, 
the evidence is too recent to interpret with 
confidence or to incorporate into this article. 
Nonetheless, the theories I discuss in this article 
will certainly be part of a full explanation for 
the recent financial crisis.
Bankers and the business press 
often speak of cycles in bank credit 
standards, periods in which banks’ 
lending standards are too lax, followed 
by periods in which standards are too 
stringent. In this view, bank lending 
policies tend to amplify fluctuations in 
GDP; easy money during the upturn 
anks’ lending standards at times seem too 
stringent and at other times too lax. The 
pattern seems to indicate that banks lend 
more easily in good times but tighten credit 
standards in lean times.  But such a lending pattern may 
also be attributable to changes in borrowers’ default risk 
over the business cycle or changes in the demand for 
loans, which rises and falls with GDP. Is there a systematic 
reason why banks might be too lax or too stringent in their 
lending? Economists have proposed a number of models to 
explain a bank lending cycle, including changes in bank 
capital, competition, or herding behavior. In this article, 
Mitchell Berlin discusses these models and the empirical 
evidence for each.
sows the seeds of tight money episodes 
in the downturn.1
But this pattern is also consistent 
with variations in bank lending driven 
by changes in borrowers’ default risk 
over the business cycle or changes 
in the demand for loans, which rises 
and falls with GDP. To make sense 
of the idea of a lending cycle, we 
must uncover a systematic reason for 
banks to make unprofitable loans 
in an upturn and to forgo profitable 
loans in a downturn. I emphasize that 
the tendency must be systematic to 
distinguish the idea of a credit cycle 
from the truism that loans made 
near the peak of an expansion are 
more likely to go bad simply because 
bankers (just like economists and 
other businessmen) have difficulties 
predicting downturns. 
What is the evidence for an 
independent effect for changing 
bank lending standards — that is, a 
systematic reason why banks might be 
too lax or too stringent?  And what 
factors might explain this type of 
behavior? Economists have proposed a 
number of plausible models of a bank 
lending cycle, emphasizing changes in 
bank capital, competition, or herding 
behavior. To date, only the channel 
relating changes in bank capital to 
lending standards has firm empirical 
support.  The available evidence is too 
weak to give us much confidence in 
assigning an important role for other 
theories of bank lending standards.
WHAT ARE CREDIT 
STANDARDS?
It is helpful to be a little clearer 
about what we mean by a change in 
bank credit standards. Let’s begin 
with a straightforward prescription 
from investment theory: A profit-
maximizing bank should make any 
loan with a positive net present value 
(NPV).  The NPV of a loan is just the 2   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
sum of discounted future repayments 
(principal plus interest) on the loan 
minus the loan amount. Future 
repayments must be discounted for 
two different reasons: First, $10 in 
the bank now is worth more than $10 
paid a year from now. After all, the 
bank could receive a year’s interest 
by purchasing Treasury bills on the 
$10 paid back tomorrow. Second, the 
bank recognizes that the borrower may 
default in the future, so the bank may 
never receive some future payments. 
The firm may have a healthy balance 
sheet at the time the loan is made; a 
year from now, the borrowing firm may 
suffer financial setbacks and may be 
unable to pay back its loan.2
Using this framework, we can 
define a change in bank credit 
standards as a change in a bank’s loan-
granting decisions for some reason 
other than a change in the NPV of the 
loan. We can define a credit cycle as a 
systematic tendency to fund negative 
NPV loans during an expansion and a 
systematic tendency to reject positive 
NPV loans during a contraction. 
Since banks’ lending decisions also 
involve the pricing and design of loan 
contracts, a credit cycle might also 
take the form of a systematic tendency 
to relax or tighten loan terms by more 
than would be justified by changes in 
borrower risk.
Conceptually, it is not too 
difficult to define a credit cycle. 
Empirically, it may be much harder 
to tell whether one has occurred. For 
example, think about some of the 
things that happen in an economic 
downturn.  As economic conditions 
become more difficult, more firms 
experience economic difficulties and 
the probability that a firm will default 
increases. This reduces the NPV of a 
given stream of repayments and would 
probably induce the bank to raise the 
loan rate, impose new contractual 
restrictions, or refuse to make the 
loan at all. While these actions might 
be interpreted as a tightening of 
standards by an outside observer or by 
an aggrieved borrower, credit standards 
haven’t changed according to our 
definition.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the 
distinction between the effects of a 
tightening of credit standards and 
the effects of an increase in credit 
risk. Figure 1a shows a probability 
distribution of loan applicants’ NPVs.  
The profit-maximizing rule for a bank 
is to make a loan as long as its NPV 
is positive (the sum of the shaded 
regions). If the bank tightens its credit 
standards, for example, making only 
loans with an NPV greater than $A, 
the bank will make a smaller number 
of loans (just the darker region). 
Figure 1b illustrates the effects of a 
downturn: Loans become riskier and 
the distribution of NPVs shifts to the 
left. But this figure shows a bank that 
retains the profit-maximizing rule. 
Note that the number of loans made 
falls in this case also (from the sum of 
the shaded regions to just the darker 
region).   
Slightly more subtly, in a 
downturn many loans often go bad 
at once. Typically, a bank will charge 
a borrower a higher loan rate if the 
borrower is likely to default at the same 
time as other borrowers in a bank’s 
portfolio default. To see this, consider 
a Detroit bank that has a portfolio 
with a high concentration of loans 
to auto parts suppliers. This bank is 
evaluating two prospective loans with 
identical probabilities of default. One 
of the loans is to an auto parts supplier, 
and the other is to a department store. 
Even though the probability of default 
is identical for both projects, the bank 
will not charge the same default risk 
premium to both. Instead, the bank 
will charge a higher risk premium for 
the loan to the auto parts supplier 
because its performance is more highly 
correlated with the rest of the bank’s 
portfolio.
Taking this idea a step further, 
economists have found that firms’ 
defaults tend to be correlated.3 
Thus, we should not be surprised 
that a bank would demand a higher 
premium for default risk in a downturn 
as compensation for the higher 
probability that many loans will go bad 
at the same time. Although the bank 
has charged borrowers a higher price 
for bearing risk, this should not be 
viewed as a change in credit standards.
In an economic downturn, 
nonfinancial firms also cut back on 
investments in plant and equipment 
and inventories, and, in turn, they cut 
back on borrowing.  A decline in the 
demand for loans should certainly not 
be viewed as a change in bank credit 
standards.      
2 To keep the discussion simple, I focus here on 
the loan-granting decision. Of course, the bank 
will set the loan rate in light of the probability 
of default. The bank will also design the loan 
contract to reduce the likelihood of default 
and to increase its payments in the event of 
default by including covenants or requiring the 
borrower to post collateral.
                                     
                                       
                                         
                                      
3 See the article by Sanjiv Das, Darrell Duffie, 
Nikunj Kapadia, and Leandro Saita.  Business Review  Q2  2009   3 www.philadelphiafed.org
FIGURES 1a and 1b
We can see the empirical 
challenge in identifying an 
independent effect for lending 
standards on the quantity of loans. 
Consider an economic downturn. In 
a downturn, default risk increases, 
risks become more correlated, and 
the demand for loans declines. None 
of these factors reflects a change in 
lending standards, but all lead to 
a decline in the quantity of loans 
made. To uncover a lending cycle, 
the researcher must find some way to 
disentangle the effects of changing 
lending standards from these other 
effects. 
THE BROAD FACTS 
Economists have documented 
a number of empirical observations 
that are broadly consistent with the 
existence of a lending cycle.4 The 
first empirical observation is that 
declines in bank capital are associated 
with declines in bank lending. Ben 
Bernanke and Cara Lown (among 
many others) have found evidence that 
large negative shocks to bank capital 
— such as those experienced by banks 
in New England at the end of the 
1980s — are associated with declines 
in bank lending. The relationship 
between capital and lending is a robust 
empirical finding, but since the weak 
economic conditions associated with 
a decline in bank capital are also 
associated with higher default risk, 
more correlated risks, and a decline in 
loan demand, economists have had to 
be ingenious in providing compelling 
evidence for the capital channel (as I 
discuss in the next section).
A second observation is the 
well-documented flight to quality 
4 Note that not all the researchers who made 
these observations were concerned with lending 
cycles or with identifying an independent role 
for bank credit standards.  
A Tightening of Credit Standards
An Increase in Credit Risk4   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
5 Traditionally, the prime rate is defined as the 
rate offered to a bank’s best customers.  Loans 
made above the prime rate are typically made 
to smaller borrowers and borrowers who do not 
have access to money market financing. 
6 See the article by Ben Bernanke, Mark 
Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist for a review of the 
empirical literature on the flight to quality.  
7 In a VAR model, each variable (e.g., change 
in credit standards, change in GDP, change 
in loans) is regressed on past values of itself 
and the other variables. Thus, each variable is 
permitted to affect the others.
                                           
                                                
                                              
                                      
during economic downturns.  For 
example, William Lang and Leonard 
Nakamura show that bank portfolios 
shift from high- to low-risk loans 
during a downturn; specifically, they 
show that bank portfolios shift away 
from loans made above the prime 
rate.5 Their finding is consistent with 
evidence that during a downturn, 
banks systematically shift their 
portfolios toward larger borrowers and 
toward borrowers with pre-existing 
loan commitments.6 While these 
studies shed light on the ways that  
bank lending may amplify negative 
economic shocks, the observed 
portfolio shifts may simply reflect a 
rise in default risk during an economic 
downturn, rather than an independent 
role for lending standards, according 
to our definition. With a rise in default 
risk, some borrowers are shut out of 
public debt markets and shift toward 
bank borrowing, while bank portfolios 
shift toward lower risk borrowers. 
A third observation is that loan 
terms vary systematically over the 
business cycle in a way that may 
amplify economic fluctuations. Patrick 
Asea and Asa Blomberg find that 
commercial loan markups (the spread 
between the loan rate and the rate 
on a riskless Treasury security) fall 
continuously right up to the beginning 
of a recession. Their interpretation of 
this finding is that credit standards 
are excessively easy at the end of an 
expansion, sowing the seeds of future 
portfolio problems. 
Jianping Mei and Anthony 
Saunders provide evidence of trend-
chasing behavior by banks. They find 
that banks increase real estate lending 
when past real estate returns are high, 
but that bank real estate investments 
are unprofitable, on average. These 
results are consistent with a systematic 
tendency for excessively lax credit 
standards during an expansion, 
and they may also be evidence of 
a tendency for banks to invest in 
a herd-like manner. However, the 
evidence from commercial lending 
and real estate lending markets 
may simply mean that banks have 
difficulty predicting a downturn (just 
like everyone else). Thus, banks may 
continue lending strongly even as the 
downturn begins.
The most direct evidence for a 
direct role for bank credit standards 
comes from survey results. Cara Lown 
and Donald Morgan analyze the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan 
Officer Opinion Survey, in which 
bankers are asked periodically whether 
they changed their credit standards 
in the previous three months. They 
are also asked to explain how their 
standards changed, e.g., changes in 
collateral requirements, covenants, 
and loan markups, as well as the 
underlying reasons for any change. 
Using a statistical analysis called a 
vector autoregression (VAR), Lown 
and Morgan find that changes in 
credit standards (as measured by 
survey responses) have a significant 
effect on both the quantity of bank 
loans and GDP.7 Interestingly, changes 
in GDP do not have a significant effect 
on lending standards, suggesting an 
independent role for credit standards. 
While this is perhaps the most 
convincing evidence that changes 
in bank credit standards have an 
independent effect,  Lown and Morgan 
do not provide evidence that banks 
systematically choose excessively lax or 
risky lending standards.
To sum up, there is survey 
evidence of an independent role for 
bank credit standards, and a number 
of empirical observations are broadly 
consistent with the existence of a 
lending cycle.  Making further progress 
requires a theoretical framework 
that would permit us to disentangle 
the various effects on banks’ lending 
behavior.
CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
LEAD BANKS TO TIGHTEN 
STANDARDS
Bank Lending Is Limited by 
Bank Capital. A wide range of models 
show that a firm’s investments in plant, 
equipment, and inventories are limited 
by the firm’s capital, i.e., the funds 
committed by the firm’s owners. A 
bank is just a particular type of firm, 
but instead of investment in goods 
and machines, its main investments 
are loans. While the precise link 
between capital and investment differs   Business Review  Q2  2009   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
from model to model, the element 
common to all of them is that agency 
problems limit firms’ access to outside 
funding. In our context, the term 
“agency problem” refers to a conflict 
of interest between a firm’s insiders 
— owners and top managers, who are 
influential in a firm’s decision-making 
— and outside investors — depositors, 
bondholders, and perhaps small 
stockholders, who control only their 
willingness to provide funds. 
For example, in Bengt Holmstrom 
and Jean Tirole’s model, the bank’s 
insiders have a choice between 
carefully monitoring borrowers and 
avoiding the costs of monitoring.8 A 
carefully monitored loan has low risk 
and positive NPV; a loan that is not 
monitored has a high risk of default 
and a negative NPV. The underlying 
agency problem is that a firm’s insiders 
will forgo monitoring and make 
high-risk loans unless they receive 
a sufficiently large share of the total 
profits.9  But providing insiders with 
incentives to monitor limits the share 
of the returns left over for outside 
investors, who will refuse to provide 
funds unless their own expected rate of 
return is adequate.
The role of bank capital in all 
this is that a firm’s insiders have a 
stronger incentive to engage in costly 
monitoring of loans when more of their 
own funds are at risk, i.e., when bank 
capital is higher. Outside investors 
will refuse to provide funds to banks 
that are not well-capitalized.10 In 
Holmstrom and Tirole’s model, a bank 
with insufficient capital may be unable 
to convince outside investors to fund 
loans that would have positive NPV 
if the bank could make a credible 
guarantee to monitor. 
When Bank Capital Falls, 
Banks Tighten Lending Standards. 
Loan losses are countercyclical; in 
particular, in an economic downturn, 
more borrowers default and loan 
losses increase (Figure 2).  Higher 
loan losses reduce bank capital, and 
the availability of outside financing 
also decreases. In turn, banks may 
be forced to forgo loans with positive 
NPV (if properly monitored); that 
is, banks will have excessively tight 
lending standards. Most models that 
focus on the link between capital 
and the availability of outside funds 
focus on economic capital, but similar 
limits on lending arise if regulators 
limit bank lending when loan losses 
press banks against regulatory capital 
requirements. 
Note that this model predicts 
that capital shortages will restrict 
lending but it doesn’t predict that 
banks would ever have excessively lax 
credit standards.  That is, according 
to Holmstrom and Tirole, banks will 
forgo positive NPV loans when access 
to outside funds is restricted because 
their capital is low, but high bank 
capital doesn’t increase the likelihood 
that a bank will make a negative NPV 
loan.  
Empirical Evidence for the 
Capital Channel.  A large empirical 
literature documents the effect of 
negative shocks to banks’ capital 
8 I am interpreting Holmstrom and Tirole’s 
model in a banking context. Their model is 
actually cast in more general terms. Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist’s article describes some 
other agency-based models that yield results 
similar to Holmstrom and Tirole’s.  
9 In the Holmstrom and Tirole model, insiders 
can’t promise to monitor carefully or to fund 
only positive NPV loans because outsiders 
have too little information about the details of 
lending decisions to ensure that the promise is 
kept.
10 The concept of capital used in Holmstrom 
and Tirole’s study is often called net worth or 
economic capital. This is not exactly the same 
thing as regulatory capital, although net worth 
corresponds fairly closely to tier 1 capital, which 
mainly includes equity.  
Source: Report of Condition
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on bank lending. In particular, a 
number of studies of the 1990-92 
credit crunch in the U.S. show 
that declines in bank capital were 
systematically associated with declines 
in bank lending, consistent with the 
statements of bankers, borrowers, and 
bank regulators at the time.11 While 
consistent with an independent effect 
for bank capital on lending standards, 
these studies are not fully convincing 
because the same factors that led to 
declines in bank capital also led to a 
decline in the demand for loans and to 
a decline in loans’ NPV. Specifically, 
the credit crunch occurred following 
an economic downturn triggered, 
in part, by serious downturns in the 
commercial real estate markets in 
New England, California, and the 
Southwest. At a minimum, these 
studies don’t fully disentangle the 
relative importance of demand effects, 
changes in credit risk, and declines in 
bank capital.  
Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren’s 
studies of Japanese banks’ lending in 
the U.S., following the collapse in 
Japanese equity prices in 1989-92 and 
the precipitous decline in the Japanese 
real estate market beginning in 1991, 
provide the most convincing evidence 
for a significant, independent channel 
relating capital to lending standards. 
In these studies, which cover the 1989-
96 period, Peek and Rosengren find 
that U.S. branches of Japanese banks 
reduced commercial and industrial 
loans and real estate loans when their 
parent bank’s capital fell.12 So, for 
example, the U.S. branch of a Japanese 
bank operating in New York would 
reduce its commercial real estate loans 
in the state when its parent suffered 
a decline in capital, even though 
U.S. commercial banks operating in 
the same state were increasing their 
commercial real estate loans.  Peek and 
Rosengren’s studies provide convincing 
evidence that the decline in capital 
was a major cause of the decline in 
lending, because the U.S. banks and 
U.S. branches of Japanese banks 
both faced essentially the same local 
business conditions (default risk and 
loan demand) in the U.S.  
COMPETITION MAY AFFECT 
LENDING STANDARDS 
Every episode in which lending 
expands rapidly and loan terms 
become more lenient is accompanied 
by statements from bankers and other 
market players that competition drives 
them to relax lending standards. 
For example, a manager at Standard 
and Poor’s, a credit rating agency,  
explained the growth of “covenant-
lite” loans during a fiercely competitive 
loan market in 2006 as follows: “When 
you have a lot of money chasing deals, 
lenders may lose their appetite for 
enforcing covenants and are more 
willing to waive them.”13
Competition and the Winner’s 
Curse. Economic theorists have 
explored the possibility that aggressive 
competition might lead to a decline in 
lending standards.  In particular, they 
have argued that economic booms 
generate competitive pressures that 
may induce banks to screen borrowers 
less carefully. An element common to 
a number of the theoretical models is 
a phenomenon that will be familiar 
to anyone who has purchased a home 
in a bidding war or won an online 
auction and worried, “I must have paid 
too much. If I had offered less, I still 
would have won.” When a bank knows 
that a successful loan applicant has 
approached multiple banks, it worries 
that it has won the firm’s business only 
because other banks have decided that 
the borrower was not creditworthy. 
Economists call this effect the winner’s 
curse. In these models, banks compete 
more aggressively when the winner’s 
curse is less serious, as may be true 
in an economic expansion. Notably, 
aggressive competition may lead 
banks to lend without screening some 
borrowers.14
11 Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren’s articles provide 
the main references.
12 They also find a strong negative effect for 
nonperforming loans. Peek and Rosengren 
argue that Japanese banks postponed 
recognizing loan losses, so nonperforming loans 
may be a proxy for unrecognized loan losses.
13 Quoted in Serena Ng’s article.
14 Not all models of competition and lending 
standards build on the idea of the winner’s 
curse. For example, Gary Gorton and Ping 
He’s interesting model views a credit crunch 
as a breakdown in oligopolistic cooperation 
among banks. In their model, banks shift 
between periods when they cooperate and 
perform a normal level of monitoring, and 
periods in which cooperation breaks down and 
banks engage in excessive monitoring. Robert 
Hauswald and Robert Marquez argue that 
competition reduces market power over repeat 
customers, thus reducing incentives to monitor. 
I focus on theories of lending cycles, rather 
than on theories of the effects of secular 
changes in competitive conditions — for 
example, due to regulatory reforms — on banks’ 
incentives to take risks. There is a large, and 
largely inconclusive, literature on the effects of 
competitive conditions on risk-taking. For an 
account of this literature, see Elena Carletti’s 
article.
Every episode 
in which lending 
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Martin Ruckes proposes a model 
of lending booms, in which underlying 
economic conditions affect bank 
screening decisions. In his model, 
borrowers approach multiple banks 
that can respond in one of three ways:  
(i) screen the applicant (and make 
loans only to applicants who appear 
creditworthy); (ii) reject the applicant 
out-of-hand; or (iii) make a loan offer 
without screening.15 
In a recession, when default risk is 
high, banks believe that customers are 
not likely to be creditworthy. Consider 
a lender’s thought process when a 
borrower applies for a loan and average 
credit risk is high. Since average credit 
risk is high, the bank worries that the 
loan applicant has failed competitors’ 
credit screens. Thus, the bank would 
never lend without carefully screening 
loan applicants. Even if the customer 
passes the lender’s screen, the bank 
still charges a high loan rate because 
it worries that it has missed something 
other lenders have noticed. When 
economic conditions are very poor, the 
winner’s curse can become so severe 
that banks will simply turn away some 
borrowers without screening.
During an economic boom, 
borrowers’ creditworthiness improves. 
Of course, not all borrowers are 
good risks, but the likelihood that 
any particular borrower will prove 
to be creditworthy increases in good 
economic times. Thus, the winner’s 
curse is less severe, and banks will 
tend to compete more aggressively for 
customers. This competition takes 
an interesting form. In addition to 
charging a low loan rate to those 
customers they find to be creditworthy, 
banks make some loans without 
screening at all.   
Ruckes’s model yields outcomes 
that look like a credit cycle. In 
particular, the fierce competition in 
the upturn yields high loan default 
rates (because of lax screening) and 
low expected bank profits. Credit 
standards are much more stringent 
in a downturn, and borrowers may 
be turned away altogether, a model 
prediction that resembles a flight to 
quality.
Empirical Evidence for the Com-
petition Channel. The evidence for 
an independent effect for competition 
is mainly anecdotal. One piece of evi-
dence comes from the Senior Loan Of-
ficer Opinion Survey, which asks those 
bankers who tightened or loosened 
standards to provide a reason. Respon-
dents typically emphasize competitive 
factors, even though they are also 
given the chance to ascribe the change 
in lending standards to a number of 
factors reflecting credit risk.16 
Respondents code their responses, 
with 1 denoting “not important,” 2 
denoting “somewhat important,” and 3 
denoting “very important.” So, for ex-
ample, in the November 2004 survey, 
respondents ascribed their easing of 
loan terms primarily to more aggres-
sive competition, with an average score 
of 2.54. (That is, most respondents 
said that competitive conditions were 
either somewhat important or very 
important.) At the same time, they 
noted that easier loan terms were also 
partially due to a more favorable eco-
nomic outlook, with an average score 
of 1.87. These responses correspond 
to press reports that competition was 
heating up in 2004.
While this type of survey evidence 
provides a fairly accurate indicator 
of bankers’ own views of the forces 
underlying changes in credit standards, 
most economists remain skeptical. In 
particular, without convincing econo-
metric evidence, economists worry 
that respondents haven’t adequately 
distinguished the relative roles of 
default risk and competitive pressures 
that drive their lending decisions. 
Indeed, Ruckes’s model, which empha-
sizes the close connection between the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and the 
aggressiveness of competition, suggests 
that these will be very difficult to dis-
entangle, not only for econometricians 




Reputational Concerns Can 
Induce Banks to Herd.  Many com-
mentators suggest that lenders’ credit 
standards are interdependent even 
when they are not competitors; for ex-
ample, banks often seem to postpone 
recognizing loan losses until they all 
jointly tighten standards in a herd-like 
movement. A famous example is Citi-
corp’s May 20, 1987, announcement 
that it was increasing loan-loss reserves 
against its loans to less developed 
countries (LDC), following a long 
period in which banks had dealt with 
their troubled LDC debt either by pro-
viding borrowers new funds to pay off 
old loans or by rescheduling old loans. 
By the end of June 1987, 32 banks had 
increased their own loan-loss reserves 
against LDC debt.17 
 In Raghuram Rajan’s model, 
banks may act this way because bank 
managers have reputational concerns 
15 To be precise, lenders may also play mixed 
strategies; for example, a loan applicant may be 
screened with some probability and given a loan 
without screening with some probability.  
    
16 Respondents are given different 
(nonexclusive) choices to explain why they 
changed their lending standards, including (i) 
more (less) aggressive competition from other 
banks or nonbank lenders; (ii) more (less) 
favorable or uncertain business environment; 
(iii) improvement (worsening) of industry-
specific problems; and (iv) increased (reduced) 
tolerance for risk.  Choices (ii)-(iv) are all 
reasonably interpreted as factors related to 
default risk.
17 Theoharry Grammatikos and Anthony 
Saunders discuss this episode in detail.8   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
that lead them to focus on short-term 
results. For example, top bank man-
agers are more likely to be promoted 
or recruited by other banks if recent 
financial results have been strong. In 
his model, some lenders have superior 
ability in identifying profitable loans. 
Crucially for Rajan’s analysis, differ-
ences in ability matter primarily when 
loan market conditions are favorable. 
When economic conditions are good, 
only the loans originated by high-
ability lenders have a low probability of 
default. However, in a downturn, loans 
turn out poorly for both high- and 
low-ability lenders. Also important for 
Rajan’s conclusions, bank managers’ 
information — both about their own 
portfolio and about general loan mar-
ket conditions — is superior to that of 
other market participants.18  
Consider a lender’s decision when 
he or she discovers that a number of 
the bank’s loans are having serious 
problems. The lender can  recognize 
losses immediately or relax credit 
standards — provide new funds or 
reschedule loan payments — in the 
hope that the borrower’s situation 
will turn around.  By assumption, 
the bank’s profits are maximized by 
recognizing losses now, rather than by 
throwing good money after bad.
But the lender is concerned about 
his or her current reputation, as well 
as the profitability of the bank’s loan 
portfolio. Concerns about reputation 
generate a systematic bias toward 
excessively lax credit standards.  Note 
that unlike Holmstrom and Tirole’s 
model, Rajan predicts that banks 
have a systematic tendency to make 
negative NPV loans.  
To see why, think about how 
market players update their view 
of a lender’s ability when the bank 
recognizes losses. Loan losses are 
bad news about the lender’s ability 
when market conditions are good.  
Unless market participants are quite 
sure that loan market conditions are 
unfavorable, the lender’s reputation 
will suffer; that is, market participants 
will downgrade their view of the 
lender’s ability. To avoid taking a hit 
to his or her reputation, the lender 
will knowingly throw good money 
after bad, unless market conditions are 
widely viewed to be poor.
But how does this lead to herding 
behavior? The key is that the lender’s 
reputation also depends on what 
other banks do. If other banks have 
written down loans, a lender can 
recognize losses and the market will 
not judge the lender harshly. Market 
participants will simply infer that loan 
market conditions are poor and that 
all banks are facing a difficult lending 
environment. But if one bank alone 
writes down its bad loans, its lender’s 
reputation will take a hit.  
Thus, banks have a systematic bias 
toward lax credit standards because 
of reputational concerns. But when 
the economy moves into a downturn, 
banks ultimately shift toward a strict 
lending policy as all banks recognize 
losses in a herd.  While a single 
bank in isolation would choose lax 
standards in a downturn to avoid 
taking a negative hit to its reputation, 
the existence of other banks permits 
all banks to jointly tighten lending 
standards. In effect, banks achieve a 
form of coordination; as long as they 
tighten jointly, market participants 
assign a high probability of a harsh 
lending environment.
Herding Without Reputation. 
Other models predict herding behavior 
in bank credit standards but without 
reputational effects. In the herding 
models described in the article by 
Sushil Birkchandan, David Hirshleifer, 
and Ivo Welch, banks place excessive 
reliance on decisions made by other 
banks, sometimes overriding the 
decision they would make based on 
their own information. How does this 
work? 
Each banker has some useful, but 
idiosyncratic information about the 
profitability of a loan. Note that it 
makes complete sense for one banker 
to take account of a previous banker’s 
lending decision, since each banker 
knows that others also have useful 
information. If each lender could 
actually observe the information used 
by previous lenders, lending decisions 
would become progressively more 
informed. Each lender would be adding 
its own information to that of previous 
banks.  
Things are different if bankers 
observe only the decisions made 
by previous lenders (as is realistic), 
rather than the information on which 
the decisions were based. In this 
case, sequential decision-making 
can lead to what economists call an 
informational cascade. That is, the 
decisions of previous banks ultimately 
lead subsequent banks to override 
their own information.  So a bank will 
rationally follow the crowd even if its 
own credit analysis suggests that a 
lending decision is too risky.
Consider an example. First 
Bank might view an investment in a 
shopping mall as marginally profitable. 
The bank’s risk managers are actually 
quite worried about a possible 
downturn in the real estate market. 
But a number of First Bank’s past 
commercial real estate investments 
are maturing and the bank does 
not intend to replace them. So the 
lending officers argue that the risk is 
not so great after all, and First Bank 
decides to make the loan. Imagine that 
Second Bank views shopping malls as 
18 The assumption that bankers have better 
information about general loan market 
conditions may seem unrealistic. However, 
it is enough that bank managers learn about 
loan market conditions before other market 
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a profitable investment and also makes 
the loan.  
Now consider Third Bank’s 
decision. Third Bank has evaluated 
the shopping mall and decided that 
it is too risky based on its own cash 
flow projections. Third Bank has also 
observed that both First Bank and 
Second Bank have decided to lend, but 
the bank is not privy to First Bank’s 
future plans to limit its real estate 
exposure. On this basis, Third Bank 
might (rationally) decide to override its 
own cash flow projections and make 
the investment anyway. 
What about Fourth Bank? Fourth 
Bank and all subsequent banks will 
never know that Third Bank’s cash 
flow analysis was negative, only that 
the bank decided to invest. In this 
example, had banks shared their 
information collectively, they might 
have decided that shopping malls were 
a negative NPV investment.
Empirical Evidence for Herding.  
While stories about informational 
cascades abound in the business press, 
there is, as of yet, no econometric 
evidence that permits us to distinguish 
informational cascades from 
reputational explanations (such as 
Rajan’s), which also predict herding 
behavior. Also, it is very difficult to 
distinguish herd-like behavior from 
instances in which banks act in a 
correlated way because they share 
common information or even because 
of regulatory pressures.19 That many 
banks make similar investments 
that ultimately turn out badly is not 
necessarily evidence of herding. 
CONCLUSION
Bankers, business analysts, 
and economists often speak of a 
credit cycle, in which bankers adopt 
excessively lax credit standards in 
an upturn and excessively stringent 
credit standards in a downturn.  
The expansion in mortgage loans, 
particularly the growth in low- and 
no-doc loans in 2006-07, and the 
widespread cutback in mortgage 
loans during the financial crisis that 
followed, is the most recent episode. 
Broadly, three classes of explanations 
might generate this type of credit 
cycle or, at least, some aspects of a 
cycle. In one explanation, banks’ 
lending standards are driven by shocks 
to bank capital. This explanation 
has both well-founded theoretical 
foundations and convincing empirical 
support. Second, there are also many 
interesting and plausible models in 
which competitive conditions can be 
shown to affect lending standards, 
but there is little hard econometric 
evidence that competitive pressures 
have an empirically significant 
effect.  Finally, there are a number 
of plausible models in which lending 
standards are driven by herding 
behavior. In particular, reputational 
concerns or informational cascades 
can lead lenders to follow correlated 
lending strategies, even when loans 
have negative NPV. To date, there 
is insufficient empirical evidence 
to support either competition or 
herding as explanations for lending 
cycles. Learning more about the 
underlying sources of variation in 
lending standards is an important 
area for further economic research. 
A careful examination of the recent 
episode in credit markets should lead 
to valuable insights for researchers and 
policymakers. B R 
                                        
                                          
                                           
19 Viral Acharya and Tanju Yorulmazer argue, 
for example, that banks may choose correlated 
investment strategies because they know that 
regulators will bail out banks when a large 
number of banks fail at the same time. To 
explain their finding that banks’ real estate 
investments reflect trend chasing, Mei and 
Saunders suggest that bank regulation may lead 
to correlated investment strategies. They argue 
that once examiners have permitted one bank 
to make an investment, others can follow.REFERENCES
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